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Both the doctrine of delivery and the law of gifts of choses in
action have been the subjects of a great deal of learned investi-
gation and discussion., The theoretical interest and practical
importance - of the legal problems covered by these topics have
induced such extended treatment that it may seem to be going
over old material to renew the discussion here. But it appears
to the writer that there is one corner of the field whiich has re-
ceived comparatively little attention, but which merits careful
consideration. This belief is justified by a reference to a section
of the Restatement of Contracts published by the American Law
Institute. In dealing with the subject of gratuitous assignments,
the framers of that laudable work state the law as follows:
"The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous as-
signment is revocable by the assignor's death, by a subsequent
assignment by the assignor, or by notice from the assignor re-
ceived by the assignee or by obligor, unless: (a) the assignment
is in a writing either under seal or of such a nature as to be
capable of transferring title to a chattel without delivery thereof
and without consideration; or (b) the assigned right is evidenced
by a tangible token or writing, the surrender of which is re-
quired by the obligor's contract for its enforcement and this
token or writing is delivered to the assignee; or (c) the assignor
should reasonably expect the assignment to induce action or
' See Ames, Inalienability of Choses in Action (1909) 3 SELECT ESSAYS
iN ANGLO-ADmERIcAN LEGAL HisToRy 580; Cook, The Alicizability of Choses
in Action (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 816; Cook, The Alienability of Choses
in Action: A reply to Professor Williston (1917) 30 H, v. L. R v. 449;
Costigan, Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses in Action (1911) 27 L. Q. REv. 326;
Jenks, Consideration and the Assignmwnt of Chosca in Action (1900) 10
L. Q. REV. 241; Williston, Is the Right of an A-ignee of a Chose in Action
Legal or Equitable? (1916) 30 HAuv. L. REV. 97. For a reply to the
article by Professor Jenks see, Anson, Assignment of Choses in Action
(1901) 17 L. Q. REv. 90.
For a discussion of delivery see Mechem, The Requirement of Delivcry
in Gifts of Chattels and Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instru-
ments- (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 457, 568; Stone, Delivery in Giftc of
Personal Property (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 196; Pollock, Gifts of Chattels
Without Delivery (1890) 6 L. Q. REv. 446.
2 As to the importance of the law of gifts, one of the writers on the
subject makes the following statement: "A very brief examination of
the authorities is sufficient to convince one that recent years have wit-
nessed a large increase, both in the number of litigated gifts, and in the
value of the property involved." Mechem, op. cit. supra note 1, at 341, n. 5.
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forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the assignee and such action or forbearance is induced." 3
Particular attention is called to Subsection (b), which raises
the problem to be discussed in this paper.4
Wjhat is meant by a "tangible token or writing, the surrender
of which is required by the obligor's contract for its enforce-
ment," is made clearer by the comment appended to the Restate-
ment. Commenting on Subsection (b) the authors state:
"Surrender of a tangible token or writing is required by the
obligor's contract not only where the requirement is stated in
express terms, but also where it is a proper implication from
business usage or other surrounding circumstances."
The following illustration is then given:
"A delivers gratuitously to B a memorandum and a written
contract, in each case evidence of an obligation of C to A, but of
which the surrender is not required by the respective contracts
as a condition of enforcing a right against C, with the expressed
intent of making B the owner of the rights of which these docu-
ments are evidence. A's death, a subsequent assignment by him
or a notice delivered by him to B or C revokes the gift, and if B
thereafter obtains satisfaction of the obligation he must sur-
render the proceeds to A or to his estate or his subsequent as-
signee." 1
From this discussion it is clear that, so far as ordinary simple
contracts are concerned,7 the kind of instrument the authors are
referring to is one which, by the express or implied terms of the
assigned contract, is required to be presented or surrendered to
the obligor as a condition of the obligor's duty to perform, and
they do not propose to include within their definition of "deliv-
erable" instruments documents which are purely evidentiary in
character and which are essential to the enforcement of the con-
s CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) c. 1-7, § 158.
4 This paper does not deal with gifts by way of written assignment or
order. As to gift by check, cf. Rolls v. Pearce, 5 Ch. D. 730 (1877); In
re Swinburne, [1926] Ch. 38.
5 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) c. 1-7, § 158.
6 The authors admit that the case of In re Huggins' Estate, 204 Pa.
167, 53 Atl. 746 (1902) presented this exact situation and the court held
the assignment irrevocable. They evidently contend that the case was
wrongly decided. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) 271. For
further discussion of this case, see inf ra at 856.
7 The framers of the Restatement admit that an obligation evidenced
by a non-negotiable bond, a life insurance policy, or a certificate of stock
may be irrevocably assigned by the delivery of the document. CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) c. 1-7, p. 192, illustration 1. Just how
these instruments differ from the ordinary written contract is not made
clear.
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tract only in so far as they are necessary evidence of its terms.0
It is respectfully submitted that such an interpretation of the
law of assignment is not sustained by the authorities and that a
review of the cases will show that an irrevocable gratuitous as-
signment may be created by the delivery of an instrument ack-
nowledging the indebtedness or obligation on the part of the
obligor to the assignor and which, in any action for the enforce-
ment of the assigned contract, would be the best evidence of the
obligee's claim, even though the instrument is not required to be
presented to the obligor as a condition of enforcing the contract
against him. It is the purpose of the present paper to show the
basis of this contention by reviewing the development of the
doctrine of delivery as applied to gifts of choses in action.
It is well known that by the early law a chose in action was
unassignable 9 and that the doctrine of delivery was first worked
out with reference to the transfer of tangible chattels. The
origin of the idea that without written assignment property can
be transferred only by delivery has been the subject of consider-
able speculation. There seems to be good ground for believing
that it developed from the notion in the early law that seisin was
an element in the ownership of chattels as well as of land.21 It
most certainly had its origin in part in the medieval point of
view of the early judges who failed to realize clearly the distinc-
tion between tangible things and intangible rights in things. To
the matter-of-fact judge of the middle ages the obvious way to
transfer a thing was to hand it over; and to permit A to say that
8 The only cases cited by the framers of the Restatecincn as supporting
their interpretation of the law are those relating to gifts of bank deposits.
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) c. 1-7, pp. 270-271. These
are cases holding that the delivery of a bank pass-book is insuilicient to
create an irrevocable assignment for the reason that such a book is not
required to be presented at the bank when withdrawals are made. Such
cases are the only ones cited as supporting the rule of the Restacmcnt;
but it is submitted that they do not stand for the broad proposition that
the delivery of an instrument completely evidencing a chose cannot create
an irrevocable assignment unless the instrument delivered is one required
to be presented to the obligor as a condition of enforcing the contract
against him. This question is discussed below.
9 It was the contention of Dean Ames that choses in action never did
become completely alienable and that an assignee, even in the modern law, re-
ceived merely a power of attorney. See Ames, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 580.
For further discussion of Dean Ames' theory see Cook, articles op. cit.
supra note 1; Williston, op. cit. supra note 1. Practically no trace of this
"Power of Attorney" theory is found in the Restatenent by the American
Law Institute.
But even Dean Ames admitted that the delivery of a document repre-
senting the chose, such as a common law or mercantile specialty, created
an irrevocable assignment. See Costigan, op. cit. supra note L
lo See Maitland, The Seisin of Chattels (1885) 1 L. Q. Ilv. 324; Ames,
The Disseisin of Chattels (1889) 3 HARV. L. REV. 23, 313, 337.
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he gave a horse to B while at the same time keeping possession
of it was too contradictory to be considered.11 However this
may be, it was firmly established before choses in action became
assignable 12 that an irrevocable gift of personal property could
be made only by written assignment properly executed, or by
delivery of the res.13
It is extremely difficult to regulate the transfer of property
on a strictly possessory basis and, therefore, as the significance
of seisin as an element of transfer by gift faded into the past
and as judges began more fully to realize the nature of property
and property rights, a tendency appeared to accept other evi-
dence, equally corroborative of the intent to give, in lieu of actual
transfer of possession." This tendency to qualify the require-
ment of actual delivery of possession first appeared in the theory
of constructive delivery. The delivery of a key to a chest would
substitute for the actual delivery of the property in the chest,"
for this was a transfer of the means of acquiring possession of
the property given.
Thus the stage was set when, in the early part of the eight-
eenth century, the sudden influx of cases dealing with gifts
causa mortis 10 presented new problems to test the old rules. In
1744 in the case of Snellgrove v. Baily," Lord Hardwicke gave
the first discussion of the doctrine of delivery as applied to
choses in action. That was the case of a gift causa mortis of a
bond which had been delivered by the donor to the donee. The
chancellor held the gift valid saying, "You cannot sue at law
without a bond; for though you may give evidence of a deed at
law that is lost, yet you cannot of a bond, because you must
11 See Mechem, op. cit. supra note 1, where the cases dealing with de-
livery are exhaustively reviewed and a rational basis for the theory is
suggested.
1,2 The earliest case holding that a chose in. action may be assigned by
delivery of a written instrument is Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300 (1710),
where it was held that Exchequer Tallies were proper subjects of a gift
causa mortis.
23 The two leading English cases standing for this proposition are Irons
v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Ald. 551 (1819) and Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B. D.
57 (1890).
14 A case forcibly illustrating this tendency is Hillebrant v. Brewer,
6 Tex. 45 (1851), where the court held that the registration of a cattle
brand by a father in the name of his child and the branding of cattle in
the possession of the father with the intention of giving them to the child
was a good gift of the cattle to the child. The delivery was symbolical or
constructive.
135 Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270 (1738).
a This influx was evidently due to a desire to assist legatees whose
gifts failed to comply with the Statutes of Frauds recently passed. See
Rundell, Gifts of Choses in Action (1918) 27 YMX L. J. 643.
TI 3 Atk. 214 (1744).
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make profert of it." 28 Having held that a good gift caua, Mortis
of a bond could be made by delivery, the court was soon asked
to apply its ruling to another kind of instrument. Eight years
later in the famous case of Ward v. Turncr,0 Lord Hardwicke
was presented with the question of how far the new law permit-
ting the assignment of choses in action would qualify the old
rules of delivery. The case was similar on its facts to many
which have come before the courts in recent years. The donor,
having possession of certain receipts for South Sea Annuities
which were owned by him, but which were in the custody of a
third party, transferred the receipts to the donee with the ex-
pressed intent of making a gift causa inortis. It was argued
for the validity of the gift that "where livery cannot be, the best
evidence that nature will admit, being only to show the mind of
the donor, will do," but the court held the gift incomplete. In
speaking of Snellgrove v. Baily,-- Lord Hardwicke said:
"It was argued that there was no want of actual delivery
there or possession, the bond being but a chose in action, and
therefore there was no delivery but of the paper. If I went too
far in that case, it is not a reason I should go farther: and I
chuse to stop there. But I am of the opinion that decree was
right, and differs from this case; for though it is true that a
bond, which is specialty, is a chose in action, and its principal
value consists in the thing in action, yet some property is con-
veyed by the delivery; for the property is vested; and to this
degree that the law-books say, the person to whom this specialty
is given, may cancel, burn, and destroy it; the consequence of
which is, that it puts it in his power to destroy the obligee's
power of bringing an action, because no one can bring an action
on a bond without a profert in cur."21
In discussing constructive delivery, the Lord Chancellor con-
tinues:
"... . delivery of the key of bulky goods, where wines, etc., are,
has been allowed as delivery of the possession, because it is the
way of coming at the possession, or to make use of the thing:
and therefore the key is not a symbol, which would not do. If
so, then the delivery of these receipts amounts to so much waste
paper; for if one purchases stock or annuities, what avail are
they after acceptance of the stock? It is true, they are of some
avail as to the identity of the person coming to receive: but after
that is over, they are nothing but waste paper, and are seldom
taken care of afterwards." 
2 2
28 Ibid- 214. The Lord Chancellor was here referring to the rule of pro-
fert Aiscussed below.
19 2 Ves. Sen. 431 (1752).
20 Supra note 17.




The reasoning of the case can be fully understood only by
considering it in the light of the law as it then existed. By the
rule of profert, mentioned in the decision, it was required, when
suit was brought upon a sealed instrument, .that the instrument
itself should be presented in court as part of the pleadings.
2
3
Profert was not excused if the instrument was lost or could not
be procured, for the equitable doctrine permitting the proof of
lost documents had not yet been fully recognized by the law
courts.24 Under these rules of law it was not difficult to draw the
analogy between the delivery of the bond and the delivery of
the key. The former transferred control or "dominion" over the
thing given quite as effectively as the latter. Transfer of the
bond absolutely deprived the donor of the legal means of enforc-
ing the chose represented by it.
Ward v. Turner2 5 formulated the doctrine which was the
starting point for the law of delivery in gifts of choses in ac-
tion. The case stands for two propositions which have been of
tremendous importance in the development of the law. (1) It
held that delivery, in the sense of transfer of control, was as
necessary in gifts of choses in action as it was in gifts of tangible
property.28 Proof of donative intent alone was as ineffectual in
23 The rule of profert and its development into the so-called best evidence
rule is discussed in 2 WIGMORE, Evmumcn (2d. ed. 1923) § 1177. See also
Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences (1895) 9 HARV. L. REV.
49.
24 When Lord Hardwicke made these technical rules the basis of his
decision he undoubtedly did not foresee the changes in the law which were
soon to abolish the rule of profert which enabled him to distinguish between
the delivery of a bond and the delivery of a receipt. Speaking of this in
Duffleld v. Elwes, 1 Bligh (N. s.) 497, 542 (1827), Lord Eldon said:
"Lord Hardwicke, with respect to the bond (and it is necessary that I
should take some notice of this, because there has been a change in the
law which that great judge did not foresee, but which, in later times,
and in my own time, has become very familiar in the courts of law,)-
Lord Hardwicke states, as one ground of his opinion in the case of the
bond, that it is a good gift causa mortis, because he says he who has got
the bond may do what he pleases with it. He certainly disables the person
who has not got the bond from bringing an action upon it: for, says Lord
Hardwicke, no man ever heard- (and I have seen in the manuscript of
the same Lord Hardwicke, that he said no man ever will hear)-that a
person shall bring an action upon a bond without the profert of that bond;
but we have now got into a practice of sliding from courts of equity into
courts of law, the doctrine respecting lost instruments ... ." This quo-
tation indicates very well the basis of Lord Hardwicke's decision and how
it was undermined by subsequent changes in the law.
25 Supra note 19.
26 This strict application of the doctrine of delivery to a gift of a bond
seems to show that Lord Hardwicke viewed the transaction as a completed
transfer and not as an imperfect assignment which would be enforced in
equity as a contract to assign. Since equity will not enforce a contract
unsupported by consideration, it could not complete an imperfect voluntary
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one type of case as in the other. (2) Since the delivery required
was transfer of control, the case determined the kind of a deliv-
ery which would satisfy this test as applied to a chose in action.
Only the transfer of a document which would deprive the donor
of the means of enforcing the chose would satisfy the test. For
this purpose delivery of a specialty would do, but not the trans-
fer of a simple writing, however strikingly that writing might
evidence the chose.27 This was a very logical application of the
previously developed law of delivery.
In a comparatively short time after this famous decision of
Lord Hardwicke was rendered, the whole basis of it was swept
away. Significant changes in the law took place. The rule of
profert was supplanted by another rule of much broader but less
stringent application.28 This later rule has continued down to the
present time as the "best evidence" rule by which all writings are
the best evidence of their owm contents and they must be intro-
duced to prove matters covered by their provisions unless they
have been lost or destroyed, or their absence is otherwise satis-
factorily accounted for.20  Under this changed state of the law,
Lord Hardwicke's distinction between sealed and unsealed instru-
ments has disappeared. The delivery of neither a specialty nor
a simple writing any longer necessarily deprived the donor of
the means of enforcing his chose, since they were essential only
as a matter of proof and their contents could be shown by other
evidence when their absence was satisfactorily accounted for.
As a result of this situation, the courts were caught between two
horns of a dilemma. They were compelled, either to reverse the
holding in Ward v. Turners" and decide that gifts of choses
could no longer be made by delivery of specialties, or to repudi-
ate the theory of Ward. v. Turner and declare that delivery in
the old sense of transfer of control was no longer necessary to
sustain a gift of a chose in action. The English courts have ap-
assignment as a contract to assign. But a transfer of property does not
require consideration to render it effective and, therefore, by treating the
delivery of a bond as a transfer of the property represented by the bond,
the transaction could be held effective, even though voluntary, without
violating the principle that equity will not aid a volunteer.
217 In Gardner v. Parker, 3 Mladd. 184 (1818), where a bond was held
a good subject of gift, the court said, "The case of Sneligrove v. Baily has
established that there may be a donatio vnortis causa of a bond, though not
of a simple contract debt, nor by the delivery of a mere symbol." The
use of the term "symbol" in the cases is fully as confusing as that of
"Aominion." It apparently connotes nothing more than a token, the trans-
fer of which cannot create a valid and irrevocable gift.
28 The following cases may be referred to as showing the changes which
resulted in the abolition of the rule of profert: Ex parte Greenway, 6 Ves.
812 (1802); Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 151 (1789).
29 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 23, § 1177.
so Supra note 19.
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parently followed the first course in dealing with gifts inter vivos
and the second in determining the validity of gifts causa mortis.
The first case discussing gifts inter vivos of choses in action
is Edwards v. Jones,31 decided in 1836. The facts were that A,
owning certain bonds, endorsed a memorandum on them, pur-
porting to be an assignment, and transferred them to B. A died,
and her executor, X, supposing the bonds to be lost, persuaded
the obligor to give new bonds to cover the amount of the old
ones. Upon the obligor's death, X collected on the new bonds.
B then brought suit against X to recover this money held by X.
The court found that a gift inter vivos was intended and, there-
fore, that the transaction could not be held to be a gift causa
mortis. The delivery of the bond did not complete the gift; and
since the assignment was voluntary it could not be completed in
equity32 Why the delivery of a bond should be sufficient to com-
plete a gift causa mortis but not a gift inter vivos is difficult to
understand. The distinction may be explained by the greater
leniency of the courts toward gifts causa mortis, 33 or perhaps
by the fact that Edwards v. Jones 84 was decided after the aboli-
tion of the rule of profert had rendered the reasoning of Ward
v. Turner 35 no longer applicable. Whatever the basis of the dis-
tinction, it has continued in the English law until the present
time and the courts have generally followed Edwards v. Jones
in holding that the delivery of a written instrument, even though
a specialty, will not complete a gift inter viVOs.3 0
82 1 Myl. & C. 226 (1836).
32 This was nothing more than an application of the theory explained
supra note 26.
3 Why the courts might be more lenient in such cases can be easily
understood. When a gift causa mortis is litigated the; donor is dead and
he no longer has the opportunity of completing the gift if it is held de-
fective; and if it is invalid the property passes to parties who obviously
were not intended to have it. In the case of a gift inter vivos, on the other
hand, the donor is often still living and may complete an ineffective trans-
fer if he wishes it to be enforced.
34 Supra note 31.
35 Supra note 19.
36 In Moore v. Ulster Banking Co., 11 Ir. C. L. 512 (1877), M, shortly
before his death, indorsed a bank deposit receipt and delivered it to S,
stating that it was for K. After M's death S presented the document
to the bank, which transferred the amount to S. In an action by the
administratrix of M against the bank, Edwards v. Jones was affirmed
and it was held: (1) that the transaction did not amount to a gift causa
mortis; (2) that the deposit-receipt was not a negotiable instrument pass-
ing by delivery and indorsement; that the transaction did not constitute
an equitable assignment.
In the case of In re Griffin, [1899] 1 Ch. 408 (1898), a father indorsed
a deposit receipt "Pay my son," signed his name, and delivered the receipt
to his son as a gift inter vivos. The court held there was a good equit-
able assignment of the deposit. The indorsement amounted to an order
or direction to pay which distinguished the case from Moore v. Ulster
[Vol. 89
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Even before Edwards v. Jones had determined that choses in
action could not pass inter vivos by delivery, the courts were at-
tempting to work out a theory of gifts causa mortis upon which
the result in Ward v. Turner could be sustained under the new
rules of law which had rendered Lord Hardwicke's reasoning
obsolete. In Duffield v. Elwes, the donor had attempted to make
a gift causal mortis of a bond and the mortgage securing it by
delivering the documents to the donee. The Vice-Chancellor
held 37 that the transfer of the written instruments did not com-
plete the gift, for the mortgagor had a right to resist payment
of the bond without a reconveyance of the estate and the donor
of the bond could not be compelled to complete his gift by such
reconveyance. The Vice-Chancellor made it clear that he would
not depart from the rule of Ward v. Turner 31 requiring an effec-
tive delivery to complete a gift causa vzortis.:
On appeal the case came before Lord Eldon,40 who reversed
the decision of the lower court and held that a trust was raised
by operation of law making the donor's executor trustee for the
donee. The elements of a trust were lacking,41 but the eminent
Banking Co., and the court stated that if anything more was needed to
complete the gift, the appointment of the donee as executor for the donor
perfected the gift. See also, In re Pryce, 4 Ch. D. 685 (1877), where it
was held that an assignment of a debenture of a joint-stock company by
indorsement in blank conferred good title on the assignee as against the
trustee in bankruptcy of the assignor.
The gift of a chose by written assignment seems to stand upon a dif-
ferent footing. Such assignments are generally held to be complete and
irrevocable. Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Myl. & K. 36 (1834); In re Patrick,
[1891] 1 Ch. 82. In Lee v. Magrath, L. R. 10 Ir. 313 (1882), a non-nego-
tiable promissory note was indorsed as follows: "I indorce the within
promissory note for £100 to my sister L." The note was delivered to L
as a gift and the payee died before it fell due. The assignment was held
good and Moore v. Ulster Banking Co. distinguished on the ground that
there had been no written assignment there but the donor had merely
written his name on the deposit receipt.
For interesting discussions of gratuitious assignments in English Law,
see Jenks, op. cit. supra note 1; Anson, op. cit. supra note 1.
- 1 Sim. & Stu. 239 (1823).38 Supra note 19.
89 "Where delivery will not execute .a complete gift inter vivo3, it cannot
create a donatio mnwrtis causa, because it will not prevent the property from
vesting in the executors; and, as a Court of Equity will not, inter 'vivo3,
compel a party to complete his gift, so it will not compel the executor to.
complete the gift of his testator." Duffield v. Elwes, supra note 37, at 245.
40 Supra note 24.
1 This is clear, for the donor never made a declaration of trust and
there was no fraud upon which a constructive trust could be based. This
fact has been recognized by later cases which have declared this trust doc-
trine to be entirely anomalous and limited to gifts caus inortis. In the
case of In re Dillon, 44 Ch. D. 76, 82 (1890), the court said in referring to,
Duffield v. Elwes: ".... the House of Lords there laid it down that the
executors were trustees for the donee and must do what was necessary to,
1930]
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judge recognized 42 the changes which had taken place in the law
since Lord Hardwicke's time and evidently felt that the transfer
of a bond and mortgage could not constitute an effective delivery
upon which an equitable assignment might be based. Not being
willing to hold that delivery in the old sense of transfer of con-
trol was no longer necessary in gratuitous assignments of choses
in action, he was compelled to sustain the gift upon some other
theory not requiring delivery and the trust doctrine was the
only one available.4 3 This decision of Lord Eldon established the
trust theory of gifts causa mortis and also determined that
mortgages might be the subjects of such gifts.
4'
It was not until 1851 that the court in Moore v. Darton 4,.
squarely faced the problem of formulating a theory of delivery
which should take the place of that developed by Lord Hard-
wicke. The important facts of the case were that Miss Darton
transferred certain money to Moore and took the following re-
ceipt: "Received the 22nd of October 1843, of Miss Darton, five
hundred pounds, to bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, but
not to be withdrawn at less than six months' notice. William
Moore." 40 Shortly before her death Miss Darton gave this re-
ceipt to a servant for Moore intending to make a gift causa
mortis to him of the money evidenced thereby. In the admini-
stration of Miss Darton's estate it was held that the gift was
valid. The Vice-Chancellor made a labored attempt to apply the
old rule of Ward v. Turner' 7 by which the writing delivered
must be one the existence of which is essential to the enforce-
ment of the chose. In speaking of the receipt he said:
perfect the transfer. This would not be so in the case of an incomplete
voluntary gift inter vivos-the Court would not interfere to compel either
the donor or his executors to perfect it; the doctrine is an anomalous one
peculiar to the case of a donatio nortis causa, but it is established by the
decision of the House of Lords." The trust doctrine was applied in Cas-
sidy v. Belfast Banking Co., L. R. 22 Ir. 68 (1887).
42 See quotation supra note 24.
43 It is a well known principle of trusts established by Ex parte Pyo, 18
Ves. 140 (1811), that one may create himself or his representative trustee
for another without consideration and without delivery or transfer of
property. But it is necessary that the trustor should declare his inten-
tion of creating a trust.
44 Two earlier cases had dealt with the question of gifts of mortgages.
In Richards v. Syms, B. & C. 90 (1740), Lord Hardwicke ordered a retrial
on the ground that proof of the delivery of the bond and mortgage to the
mortgagor with intent to discharge the debt would extinguish both the debt
and the mortgage. The report of Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351 (1820) is
very unsatisfactory but it appears that the Vice-Chancellor believed that
the delivery of a bond and mortgage deeds to the debtor would be a good
gift causa mortis.
454 De G. & S.517 (1851).
4GAnother receipt for a hundred pounds was given but it involved a
question of trusts which is not pertinent to this discussion.
4 Supra note 19.
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"It was a document contemporaneous, I take it, with the crea-
tion of the debt. Now this is the document which was delivered
to the agent of the debtor himself. The debt was a debt carrying
interest. A mere debt of £500 would have arisen from a loan
without any writing. But it would not have been a debt carry-
ing interest, without a contract to that effect beyond the advance.
That particular contract, I agree, might have been entered into
without writing; but as it was created by writing, proof of the
writing, if possible, was essential to recovery upon the contract;
and it is this writing which was in substance delivered mortis
ccusa to the person owing the money." 4 8
The argument of the court apparently is that a writing creat-
ing a contract or embodying its terms 48 is "in a sense essential"
to the proof of the contract for, under the best evidence rule,
such a writing, unless its absence was satisfactorily accounted
for, would be the only competent evidence of the provisions of
the contract. Under this doctrine any chose in action completely
evidenced by a written instrument could be made the subject of
a gift causL mortis by the delivery of the writing and this ap-
pears to be the principle for which Moore v. Darton is cited and
followed50
Shortly after the decision in Moore 'v. Darton the Master of the
Rolls was called upon to decide whether an unindorsed promis-
48 Moore v. Darton, supra note 45, at 520.
It is interesting to note that the debtor was the donee and that the result
of the decision was to release the debtor by surrender of a simple writ-
ing -without consideration or a written discharge, a rather significant result
in view of the statement generally made that the surrender of a simple
contract cannot operate as a release. Cf. Attorney General v. Supreme
Council A. L. H., 206 Mass. 183, 92 N. E. 147 (1910).
49 It should make no difference whether the contract were created by a
written instrument or was later reduced to writing; for the document is
as essential to the proof of the contract in the one ease as in the other.
50 In re Dillon, supra note 41, at 81, holding a banker's deposit note a
good subject of gift causa er'tis, contains the following refer-
ence to Moore v. Darton: "The mere fact of the deposit would create
a debt; but the document beside acknowledging the receipt of the money,
expressed the terms on which it was held, and showed what the contract
between the'parties was." The deposit note was held to satisfy this test.
The court in Duckworth v. Lee, [1899] 1 Ir. R. 405, 408, referring to
the receipt in Moore v. Darton, said: "This receipt was therefore evi-
dence of the entire debt and of all the terms of the loan; it proved all
the terms of the contract; and, as the contract was created by writing,,
proof of the writing was essential to recovery upon the contract." It was
held that an 1. 0. U. did not satisfy this test.
The following language appears in In re Weston, [1902] 1 Ch. 680, 685:
".. the test appears to be whether or not the document, besides acknowl-
edging the receipt of the money, expresses the terms on which it is held,
and shows what the contract between the parties is." A post office sav-
ings bank deposit book was held to come within this rule because it con-
tained the essential provisions of the contract.
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sory note payable to order might be the subject of a gift causa
mortis, and it was held in Veal v. Veal 5 that the gift was valid.
After reviewing the cases, including Ward v. Turner 5 2 and Duf-
field v. Elwes,53 the Master recognized the law to be in an unsatis-
factory state and rested his decision upon a then unreported
case,5 4 decided by Sir John Leach, whose decision in Duffield v.
Elwes had been overruled by Lord Eldon.5 5 The rule in Moore v.
Darton is the logical basis for holding that a gift of a promissory
note may be made by delivery, but the courts have never ex-
plained the theory of their decisions on this subject. Veal v. Veal
has been affirmed several times, but without discussion of prin-
ciple.56
Deposit notes or certificates and bank books have been among
the most common subjects of gifts and it is the American cases
dealing with gifts of these instruments which the framers of the
Restatement cite to sustain their interpretation of the law. In
view of this fact it is particularly interesting to note the theory
of the first English cases 57 dealing with such gifts. In M'Gonnell
v. Murray,,8 decided by the Irish Court of Chancery in 1869, the
donor had delivered to the donee a deposit book in a savings
bank, attempting to make a gift causa mortis of the deposit.
After reviewing the cases from Snellgrove v. Baily " and Ward
v. Turner - to Moore v. Daron 6 and Veal v. VealO2 the Master
of the Rolls continues:
5127 Beav. 303 (1859).
-52 Supra note 19.
53 Supra note 24.
54 Rankin v. Weguelin, 27 Beav. 309 (1829). Bills of exchange payable
to order were held proper subjects of a gift causa mortis. It does not
appear whether the bills were indorsed or not and the decision is a mere
memorandum citing no authorities and giving no grounds.
55 The Master placed great emphasis upon this fact, arguing that since
Sir John Leach had been overruled by Lord Eldon his later decision must
have been rendered in conformity with Lord Eldon's opinion, a rather
slender argument upon which to base an important decision like that In
Veal v. Veal.
50 In re Mead, 15 Ch. D. 651 (1880) (bills of exchange unindorsed);
Clement v. Cheesman, 27 Ch. D. 631 (1884) (unindorsed check payable
to order). As to I. 0. U., see supra note 53.
Early cases held that an unindorsed note or bill would not pass by
delivery. Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wins. 356 (1735); Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves.
111 (1793).
57 Amis v. Witt, 33 Beav. 619 (1863) is the first case holding that a
banker's deposit note may pass by gift causa mortis. The decision con-
tains no discussion of principle and is unsatisfactory.
583 Ir. R. Eq. 460 (1869).
69 Supra note 17.
eo Supra note 19.
61 Supra note 45.
62 Supra note 51.
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"Assuming these cases to have been all well decided, none of
them warrant the proposition contended for before me. To ex-
tend the doctrine to a bank-book would be going very much fur-
ther. I do not find in the acts "I relating to Savings Banks any-
thing to distinguish a Savings Bank pass-book from an ordinary
banker's pass-book; and were I to decide that the book in this
case is a proper subject of a donatio mortis causa, I do not see
how I could stop short of holding not only that a bank-book but
that any pass-book might be made the subject of such a gift.c0
The book of this Savings Bank is rather more unfavorable to
the claimant's case than a common bank-book would be; for by
the rules printed in it, it appears that payment will be made only
to the depositor himself, or on his power of attorney during his
life; and after his death smaller sums are payable as specified
by the rules; but if the deposit exceeds £50, it can only be paid
on production of probate or letters of administration; the book is
required to be produced, and checked with the bank ledger, and
the bank is protected against personation if it be lost. But the
book does not embody the terms of the contract between the de-
positor and the Bank; the only entries to be found in it are
figures or sums of money written in full, in a column for that
purpose, to prevent fraud. Consistently with the theory that an
actual and not a merely symbolical delivery is required, handing
over a written contract must be a delivery of the thing given;
and the right to assistance in enforcing payment of the money
due on it follows. A contract embodied in a writing is in a sense
capable of being given; only one person can have it. But it
would be going beyond any case yet decided to hold that what is
merely evidence of, or a voucher for, the debt--of which there
may be several-is capable of being thus dealt with." CS
The test applied was the one laid down in Moore v. Darton.6 '
The Master noted that the book under litigation was required to
be presented and checked with the bank ledger, but in spite of
this fact he held that it was not the proper subject of a gift be-
cause it "did not embody the terms of the contract between the
6326 & 27 VICT. c. 87, § 6 (3) (1863); 13 CHnrr's ENGLISH STATUTES
(6th ed. 1913) 54: "That the depositor's pass-book shall be compared with
the ledger on every transaction of repayment, and on its first production
at the bank, after each 20th day of November." "The rules of every sav-
ings bank in Ireland shall specify a number of days, not less than two
in every year ending on the 20th of November, in which the book of each
depositor shall be produced at the office of said savings bank for the pur-
pose of being inspected, examined, and verified with the books of the
savings bank by the auditor or auditors." Ibid 69.
64-Since the statutes, supra note 63, required that a depositor's pass-book
should be presented at the bank on every transaction of repayment, the
later bank book cases would sustain the Master in holding that even a
pass-book would be a good subject of gift. But at the time the decision in
M'Gonnell v. Murray was rendered the distinction between writings re-
quired to be presented to the obligor as a condition to enforcing the con-
tract and those not required to be so presented had not yet been worked
out.
- M'Gonnell v. Murray, supra note 58.
6G Supra note 45.
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depositor and the bank" but contained only a column of figures.
This reasoning is approved in later cases dealing with deposit
notes as 67 well as bank books.68 These cases show that at first
certain books were held improper subjects because they did not
embody the terms of the depositor's contract, and only later did
the courts come to recognize the additional argument of whether
or not the book was required to be presented at the bank at the
time withdrawals were made.69
Upon the question of the validity of gifts of stock by delivery
of the certificate unindorsed and without transfer on the books
of the corporation there is practically no conflict in the English
authorities. The leading case of Moore v. Moore,70 decided in
1874, held that corporation stock could not be made the subject
of a gift causa mortis, and it has been regularly followed ever
since.71 The Vice-Chancellor expressed the basis of his decision
as follows:
I said in the course of the argument that I should
hold that such stock is not the subject of a donatio mortis causma
67 In re Taylor, 56 L. J. 597 (1887) ; In re Farman, 57 L. J. 637 (1887) ;
Cassidy v. Belfast Banking Co., supra note 41, at 73 (where the court said
of the deposit receipt: "It was a document contemporaneous with the debt,
which was delivered to the creditor, and which was essential to the proof
of the contract-although the contract was one which might have been
entered into without writing"); In re Dillon, supra note 41 (cases re-
viewed and Moore v. Darton followed); Porter v. Walsh, [1895] 1 Ir. R.
284; Cain v. Moon, [1896] 2 Q. B. 283.
An I. 0. U. is not the proper subject of a gift causa mortis. "It did not
even state the entire debt; for it is admitted that the debtor agreed to pay,
and actually did pay, some interest on the loan; but the I 0 U was wholly
silent as to this. The document handed over was therefore, at best, but
imperfect evidence of the debt in respect of which it was given, and which
the respondent contends passed by its delivery. It has never been held that
the delivery of a document which evidenced part of a simple contract con-
stituted a valid donatio mortis causa of the debt." Duckworth v. Lee,
supra note 50, at 407. In the ordinary case it would seem difficult to dis-
tinguish between an I. 0. U. and a non-negotiable promissory note.
68 "But the difference between a deposit note, which was the document
delivered over in the case of Amis v. Witt, and a pass-book is enormous.
A pass-book is not in any degree in the nature of a bond or an agreement."
In re Beak's Estate, L. R. 13 Eq. 489, 491 (1872).
61 The first reference to this argument appears in Cassidy v. Belfast
Banking Co., supra note 41. In In re Weston, supra note 50, a post office
savings bank deposit book was held a good subject of gift causa martis
on the ground that it contained the terms of the contract and also because
it was required to be presented at the time withdrawals were made.
This is a revival in modernized form of the doctrine of Ward v. Turner.
Presentation required by the terms of the contract is substituted for pre-
sentation in court required by the rule of profert.
TO L. R. 18 Eq. 474 (1874).
71 In re Weston, supra note 50; In re Andrews, [1902) 2 Ch. 394; cf. In re
Lee, [1918] 2 Ch. 3210. But cf. Searle v. Law, 15 Sim. 95 (1846); Mlc-
Culloch v. Bland, 2 Giff..428 (1860).
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at all, and I found this my judgment upon the case of Ward v.
Turner, before Lord Hardwicke, which I think applicable to the
case, holding as I do, notwithstanding that modern cases have
gone very far beyond the earlier cases as to donations mortis
causa, that the law, if it is to be further extended, must be so
extended by a higher tribunal. I consider that stock of this
description is not substantially distinguishable from South SeaAnnuities." ,12
The learned court appears to have misinterpreted Ward V.
Turner,-3 for the thing delivered there was not the annuities
but the receipts for them and it was upon this ground that Lord
Hardwicke rested his decision. However this may be, the courts
have not seen fit to extend the law of gifts to include stock; and
Moore v. Moore remains the law in England.
This review of the English cases shows that the English law
of gifts is in considerable confusion. The courts have developed
and somewhat haphazardly applied several different theories. (1)
It has generally been held that an irrevocable gift inter vivos
of a chose in action cannot be made, for it is incapable of com-
plete delivery. (2) Gifts caus mr s have been sustained as
trusts, or (3) they have been held good equitable assignments
where the document delivered embodied the terms of the con-
tract. (4) Lastly, the theory of Ward v. Turner lingers in some
of the cases holding that a delivery of a simple writing is not
sufficient to complete a gift causa, mortis.l
The American courts had the advantage of the discussion con-
tained in the early English cases and without difficulty or con-
flict proceeded to hold, in the first part of the eighteenth century,
72 Moore v. Moore, supra note 70, at 483.
73 Supra note 19.
7- Ward v. Turner was reaffirmed as late as 1927 by the High Court of
Justice in the Irish Free State. In the case before the court certain re-
ceipts were issued to the donor by the Bank of England and the Bank of
Ireland acknowledged the receipt of the consideration for certain stock
which was to be transferred to the donor. These receipts were delivered
with a declaration of gift causu mortis to the donee who claimed the right
to the stock. As pointed out by the court, the receipts were not given for
the stock but for the consideration paid for the stock Mr. Justice Meredith
held the gift incomplete, relying on Ward v. Turner, which he declared to
be still the law. He refused to hold that the gift could be completed by
way of a trust, although he admitted that the doctrine that equity will
not assist a volunteer by executing an incomplete gift does not apply to
gifts ausa mortis. In order to raise a trust, he said, "... . there must
in the first instance be something which merely requires to be completed in
order to perfect the legal title." In re M'Wey, [1928] Ir. R. 486, 492. In
other words the same kind of a delivery will be required to raise a trust
as to create an equitable assignment. The case cannot be reconciled with




that bonds,75 unindorsed bills and promissory notes,70 certificates
of deposit 77 and savings bank books,75 were all proper subjects
of gifts inter vivos or causa mortis. Although gifts of insur-
ance policies by delivery had received little attention in the Eng-
lish cases,79 the courts of this country early declared such gifts
to be valid. A policy of insurance is a chose in action, a con-
tractual obligation to pay money at a time in the future like a
note or a bond and, therefore, the judges saw no reason for dis-
tinguishing between insurance policies and the other instruments
which had been held proper subjects of gifts without written
assignment.80
75 Brunson v. Brunson, Meigs 630 (Tenn. 1838); Kiff v. Weaver, 94
N. C. 274 (1886); Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366 (Pa. 1811).
76 Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn. 410 (1847) ; Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me.
429 (1839) ; Kiff v. Weaver, 94 N. C. 274 (1886) ; Farrell v. Passaic Water
Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 97, 88 Atl. 627 (1913); Hopkins v. Manchester, 16 RI. I.
663, 19 Atl. 243 (1889) ; Brunson v. Brunson, supra note 75; 2 KENT, COM-
MENTARIES ON AMERCAN LAw (10th ed. 1860) 603.
"It is true that the cases, which are numerous, in which such equitable
assignments have been supported, are founded on assignments for a valu-
able consideration; but there is little, if any, distinction in this respect,
between contracts and gifts inter vivos; the latter indeed, when made
perfect by delivery of the things given, are executed contracts. By dc-
livery and acceptance the title passes, the gift becomes perfect, and is
irrevocable. There is, therefore, no good reason why property thus ac-
quired should not be protected as fully and effectually as property ac-
quired by purchase." Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 261, 263 (Mass. 1837).
"Notwithstanding the attempts which have been made in England to
distinguish between a promissory note and a bond, in relation to the val-
idity of the gift of a chose in action, there cannot in reason be any dif-
ference. A gift of either is valid as a symbolical delivery of the debt due
on the note or bond, and all the delivery of which the subject is capable."
Coutant v. Scheiyler, 1 Paige Ch. 315, 318 (N. Y. 1829).
-Mellor v. Bank of Willows, 173 Cal. 454, 160 Pac. 567 (1916); Con-
ner v. Root, 11 Colo. 183, 17 Pac. 773 (1888) ; Bosenau v. Merchants' Nat.
Bank, 56 N. D. 123, 216 N. W. 335 (1927); Westerlo v. Do Witt, 36 N. Y.
340 (1867). Other cases are collected in Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 508.
78 Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88 (1869); Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572
(1891). For additional cases see Note (1926) 40 A. L. B. 1249. Postal
savings certificates are also a proper subject for gift. Williams v. Letton,
228 Ky. 371, 15 S. W. (2d) 296 (1929).
79 The only English case seems to be Amis v. Witt, supra note 57, where
it was held that a gift causa mnortid of insurance may be made by delivery
of the policy, and that the donee is entitled to the insurance money.
80 Gordon v. Clark, 149 Ark. 173, 232 S. W. 19 (1921); Chapman v.
McIlwrath, 77 Mo. 38, 45 (1882); McGlynn v. Curry, 82 App. Div. 431, 81
N. Y. Supp. 855 (1903). For other cases see Note (1927) 47 A. L. B.
738; Ann. Cas. 1914D 297; Note (1890) 9 L. B. A. 660.
In Georgia the court has interpreted the code to require assignments of
choses in action arising upon contract to -be in writing. GA. ANN. CODE
(Michie, 1926) § 3653; Turk v. Cook, 63 Ga. 681 (1879). Applying this
rule to insurance policies, it held that delivery without written assignment
is not sufficient to constitute a completed gift. Steele v. Gatlin, 115 Ga.
929, 42 S. E. 253 (1902).
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In dealing with these problems the American courts were
merely traversing the trails already cut by their English prede-
cessorsP1 Such being the case the decisions contain very little
discussion of theory and their reasoning on the question of de-
livery usually amounts to little more than a repetition of the
old clich. that transfer of dominion amounts to a good delivery.
But the American authorities have been clear in their repudi-
ation of some of the English views. The courts have refused to
recognize any distinction in the requirements of delivery be-
tween gifts inter vivos and gifts causa nortis."- Gifts of the
first class have been as readily sustained as those of the second.
The rejection of Lord Eldon's trust theory has been equally
coinplete.83 A trust will not be raised to execute an incomplete
gift whether it be inter vivos or causa mortis. Having reached
this result, the courts have seen no inconsistency in continuing
to give lip service to the rule that the gift of a chose in action
requires complete delivery to execute it, while at the same time
they have been sustaining gifts which the English courts have
declared invalid for want of delivery,", or have held valid only
81 In cases of gift of shares of stock the American courts have taken a
more liberal view than the English judges. The majority view is that
a gift of stock may be made by delivery of the certificate unindorsed and
without transfer on the books of the corporation. Allerton v. Lang, 10
Bosw. 362 (N. Y. 1863); Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251 (N. Y. 1869);
Orton v. Tannenbaum, 194 App. Div. 214, 185 N. Y. Supp. 681 (2d Dep't
1920), commented upon in (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 767; Stone v. Hackett, 12
Gray 227 (Mass. 1858); Herbert v. Simson, 220 Mass. 480, 108 N. E. 65
(1915); Leyson v. Davis, 17 Mont. 220, 263, 42 Pac. 775 (1895). Contra:
Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455, 21 Atl. 1054 (1891). See iechem,
Gifts of Corporation Shares (1925) 20 ILL. L. REv. 9.
82 Camp's Appeal, supra note 78, held that a savings bank book was a
good.subject of a gift inter vivos. Referring to an earlier case, the court
said: "It is true that was a donatio causa, wmrtia; but the principle in-
volved is the same in both cases, as there is no difference in respect to
the requisites of a delivery between the two classes of gifts." Ib&d.. 93.
In Hopkins v. Manchester, supra note 76, the lower court held that
an unindorsed promissory note would pass caus -mortis but not intcr
'visos. The upper court reversed the decision saying: "We do not find
that the cases distinguish in this respect between gifts intcr vivos and
gifts cavsa mortis." Ibid. 664. The rule of these cases may be contrasted
with the English view expressed in Moore v. Ulster Banking Co., cupra
note 36, where it was held that a deposit receipt could not pass by gift
inter aivos.
83 12 R. C. L. 951 and cases there cited. An occasional indication to
the contrary may be found, as in Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17, 22 (1872),
where the court stated: "The representatives of the donor were trustees
for the donee by operation of law to make the gift effectual. This trust,
like this species of gift, is peculiar. ... This extended the law as laid
down by Lord Hardwicke in Ward v. Turner upon this subject, and our




on the trust theory.s5 In view of this situation, what has the
requirement of delivery in gifts of choses in action come to
mean? Whatever the courts may say, their decisions compel
one to accept the view that it means nothing more than the
transfer of an instrument which is the complete and best evi-
dence of the obligation assigned.
This conclusion is most strikingly illustrated by the American
cases dealing with gifts completed by the transfer of receipts
or similar instruments. The earliest case of this kind is Elam
v. Keen,86 decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1833. A
owned a bond which he had deposited with his attorney who had
given him a receipt. A delivered this receipt to B with a proper
declaration of gift. The court held the gift valid, declaring that
B could recover the money collected on the bond by the attorney
as against the executor of A. The opinion mentions Ward v.
Turner but proceeds on the theory that there was a good symbol-
ical delivery comparable to the delivery of a key. The terms of
the receipt are not set forth in the report but the court does not
intimate that it was required to be presented to the attorney at
the time the return of the bonds was requested.
A very interesting Kentucky case is that of Stephen-son's
Adm'Wr v. King.8' Here the donor selected the defendant as her
agent for the management of her business affairs and placed
certain money in his hands for investment. Sometime before
the transaction in controversy she wrote to the defendant in-
quiring about the condition of her accounts and, in the words
of the court, he responded "on the 13th of April, 1880, in which
he says: 'I now have in my safe one promissory note belonging
to you on W. P. Hahn and Mattie Hahn, dated February 13th,
1878; payable five years after date, for $5,500, with interest
from maturity at eight per cent. per annum' and also re*cites'
the $500 Taylor county bonds, etc." 88 This letter was signed
by the defendant, and was delivered by the donor to the donee
as a gift causa mortis of the securities held by the defendant.
In an action brought by the administrator of the donor against
the defendant it was held that the gift was valid and that the
securities belonged to the donee. In speaking of the transfer
of the letter the court made the following statement:
"No other delivery could have been made, and the arbitrary
rule such as formerly existed with reference to the delivery of
choses in action, requiring an assignment and delivery of the
identical thing in order to make such a gift valid, having long
since been abandoned, there is no reason why the intention to
85 Supra note 41.
86 4 Leigh 333 (Va. 1833).
87 81 Ky. 425 (1883).
88 Ibid. 428.
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give, with the actual delivery of the written evidence of the right
to the thing, although in the possession of another, under the
belief of the donor that it perfects the gift, should not be held
to constitute a valid gift cav sc mortis." "9
A comparatively recent case is Kaufmann 'v. Parmele,03 de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 1916. There, one
Volk was the holder of the following receipt:
"Received of William Volk, for safe-keeping, $10,000 six per
per cent. gold coupon bonds; $5,000 six per cent. preferred stock,
Long Distance Telephone Company of Norfolk, Nebraska. It
is agreed between Thomas E. Parmele and William Yolk that
these bonds and stock are to be held at the Bank of Commerce,
at Louisville, Nebraska, for five years, and the income to be paid
over to William Volk as paid. Thomas E. Parmele."
Shortly before his death Volk delivered this receipt to the plain-
tiff as a gift. After Volk's death the plaintiff sued Parmele for
the conversion of the securities and the court held the gift valid.
The following interesting statement appears in the opinion:
"The receipt was a symbol of ownership. It was written evi-
dence of defendant's obligation to keep the property for Volk
and to return it to him or to his assign. It was all Yolk had
in his possession to deliver when he made his donation ...
Plaintiff acquired the rights of Volk, and with those rights de-
fendant is not in a position to interfere. Plaintiff's ownership
by gift is therefore established by uncontradicted evidence." 01
This line of of cases "'- establishes the rule that the delivery
of a receipt evidencing the obligation of a third party to return
property or to repay money may operate as a gift of the prop-
89 Ibid. 435.
so 99 Neb. 622, 157 N. W. 342 (1916).
91 Ibid. 624, 157 N. W. at 342.
92 Lipson v. Evans, 133 Aid. 370, 105 Atl. 312 (1918); Goldsworthy v.
Johnson, 45 Nev. 355, 204 Pac. 505 (1922). In these cases an indorsement
and written assignment appeared on the back of the receipts but the courts
lay no emphasis on this fact. In both cases the delivery was held to be
symbolical and Ward v. Turner was referred to.
In Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111 (1868), the following receipt
was delivered to the debtor: "Received, Brooklyn, May 21st, 1863, from
J. Hegeman, $2803.50, also, June 1st $500.00 from A. S. Foster, both of
which sums are on account of and belonging to Mrs. Mary Champney,
and are to be disposed of in any manner she may direct, as paid to her
individually, together with whatever interest I may obtain for their use.
F. Blanchard." The court held that the transaction between Mrs. Champ-
ney and Blanchard created a deposit and that the delivery of the receipt
constituted a gift thereof. As in Moore v. Darton, supra note 45, tho
debtor in the case was the donee. In Claytor v. Piereon, 55 W. Va. 167,
46 S. E. 935 (1904), the receipt read: "Sewell, W. Va., August 26th 1899.
$1100. Eleven hundred dollars. Received of William Claytor for rafe-heep-
ing. L. C. Claytor.' The transfer of this receipt was held to complete
a gift of the deposit.
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erty or the deposit. Whether the terms of the transaction re-
quire the return or presentment of the receipt to the obligor
is entirely immaterial and the courts nowhere refer to such a
requirement as being important. The delivery of the receipt
is sufficient to complete the gift because it is complete evidence
of the obligation assigned. The receipt cases are therefore op-
posed to the rule of the Restatement.
Even in the case of gift by delivery of a written contract, re-
ferred to at the beginning of this paper, the American courts
have held the assignment valid and irrevocable, contrary to the
view expressed in the Restatement. In the Pennsylvania case
of In re Huggin's Estate,9 3 A agreed to convey certain coal rights
to B for $1,800, the money'to be paid before the execution of
the deed. The agreement was put into writing and A, desiring
to make a gift of the $1,800, delivered the writing to C. A died,
and the question arose as to whether A's executors were entitled
to the $1,800. The court held that they were not, for the gift
was complete and C had the right to the money.0'
The authors of the Restatement admit that In re Huggin's
Estate is contra to their statement of the law of assignment,91
but they evidently regard it as standing alone. In commenting
upon the case they state:
"It should be observed, however, that the Pennsylvania court
has repeatedly laid down in recent cases the principle that 'to
establish a gift inter vivos, two essential elements must be made
to appear; an intention to make the donation then and there,
93 Supra note 6.
94 The fact that the deed was yet to be executed and that the title was
still in the representatives of A was immaterial, for the execution of the
deed was not a condition precedent to the payment of the money. It was
decreed that the deed should be executed by A's executors and delivered
to C in escrow.
95 Two other cases are cited as being in conflict with the theory of the
Restatement. One is Jones, Adm'r v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126
(1898), where it was held that the delivery of a book of accounts coupled
with gift intent created an irrevocable gift of the accounts of which the
book was evidence. The other is Murphy v. Bordwell, 83 Minn. 54, 85
N. W. 915 (1901), in which the facts were as follows: A, wishing to
make a gift of a bank account to B, instructed the cashier to make out
the proper papers. The latter drew a power of attorney to himself which A
signed, and the cashier then gave B a check book. B withdrew sums
from time to time by bringing the check book to the bank and instructing
the cashier to make out the checks which he did. A creditor of A attempted
to garnishee the account but it was held that he could not, for the gift to B
was complete. Why may not the power of attorney be regarded as a
written assignment of the account, by which A constituted the cashier
the agent of B? Under this view the case deals with gifts by written
assignment and not by delivery. If such be true, it may not be contra
to the Restatement, on the theory of Fortescue v. Barnett and other
cases, supra note 36. CONTRACTS RwTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) c. 1-7,
p. 271.
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and an actual or constructive delivery at the same time, of a
nature sufficient to divest the giver of all dominion, and invest
the recipient therewith.'" 08
Nothing has been more confusing in the law of gifts than this
question-begging and mind-befogging dominion concept by
which the authors of the Restaternent apparently attempt to dis-
credit the decision of the Pennsylvania court. However useful
the idea of transfer of dominion may have been in Lord Hard-
wicke's time, when it was first applied to gifts of choses in ac-
tion, it has long outlived that usefulness and certainly furnishes
no basis today for holding that the transfer of a written contract
cannot operate as an irrevocable gift of the chose represented
by the document.
This contention is sustained by the review of the cases given
above. There is no logical reason for distinguishing between
gifts consummated by the delivery of non-negotiable promissory
notes, insurance policies, and receipts, on the one hand, and
written contracts on the other. No one of these instruments
is any more essential to the enforcement of the chose which it
evidences than are the others. Each of them is complete evi-
dence of the obligor's duty as well as the best evidence of the
obligee's right and not one of them is necessarily required to
be presented to the obligor as a condition of enforcing the
obligee's claim against him. In re Huggfi 's Estate is in accord
with the development of the American law ' and is sustained
by the English cases following the rule of Moore v. Darton.
The cases relating to gifts of bank pass-books are cited in the
Commentaries to the Restatemcnt as supporting the authors'
interpretation of the law; but it is submitted that an analysis of
the decisions in these cases will show that they are not in con-
96 Ibid.
- A similar case is Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231, 91 Pac. 950 (1907).
A contracted to sell certain land to B and the contract was reduced to
writing. Upon the payment of the purchase price the deed was to be de-
livered to B. Desiring to make a gift of the proceeds to C, his wife, A
delivered the contract and the deed to her. After A's death the question
arose as to the validity of the gift and the court held it valid.
In Estate of Cronan, Myrick 72 (Cal. 1874), A bargained to cell a lot
to B for $1,000. A, being sick, said to C, "Get the $1000 from B, pay sick-
ness and burial expenses and keep the rest.' At the same time he gave C
a paper, but what it was never appeared at the trial, since C could not
read. After A's death C took the paper to B and sEcured the money. The
court held the gift complete on the theory that C received from A a paper
which authorized her to obtain the money from B and this was a sufficient
delivery.
These cases should be compared with Attorney General v. Supreme
Council, A. L. H., 206 Mass. 183, 92 N. E. 147 (1910), where the court




flict with the doctrine represented by In re Huggin's Estate. It
is held that the transfer of a pass-book is not a sufficient de-
livery to complete a gift of the deposit08 The reason usually
given is that the book is not required to be presented at the
time withdrawals are made and hence its delivery does not
transfer control over the deposit. 9  While this cannot be de-
nied, it is equally true that the ordinary pass-book is not neces-
sarily evidence of any obligation on the part of the bank. It is
nothing more than a memorandum 100 showing that certain de-
posits have been made but not indicating whether they .have
been wholly or partially withdrawn and not stating what bal-
ance if any is due the depositor. These matters cannot be
shown in a book which is not required to be presented when
withdrawals are made.
This incomplete character of pass-books has been recognized
by the courts. The North Carolina court in distinguishing the
delivery of a pass-book from that of a bond made the following
statement: "The 'deposit book' is no more than a memorandum,
binding no one, containing no obligation, and could only be used
to refresh the memories of the depositor and depositee as to
dates and amounts of their dealings." 101 In discussing the rule
of Moore v. Darton the Irish court said in M'Gonnell v. Murray:
"But the book does not embody the terms of the contract be-
tween the depositor and the bank; the only entries to be found
in it are figures or sums of money written in full, in a column
for that purpose, to prevent fraud." 102
Since this is the nature of a pass-book,l1s the cases holding
98 Jones v. Weakley, 99 Ala. 441, 12 So. 420 (1893) ; Wilson v. Feather-
ston, 122 N. C. 747, 30 S. E. 325 (1898); Thomas, Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va.
1, 15 S. E. 389 (1892). Kentucky does not follow this view. Ashbrook v.
Ryon's Adm'r, 2 Bush 228 (Ky. 1867), overruled by McCoy's Adm'r v.
McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 104 S. W. 1031 (1907).
9 This is the basis of the distinction between pass-books and savings
bank books. See authorities cited supra note '78.
1-0 The delivery of an incomplete memorandum was considered in the
famous case of Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373 (1893). G deposited $2,316
with K, who gave G a piece of paper with eight sums on it which were
footed to $2,316. The paper was unsigned and contained nothing else
but the date. G delivered this paper to C with intent to make a gift of the
deposit. The court held the delivery insufficient. The paper did not em-
body the terms of any obligation and for this reason the decision is sound.
See infra notes 103, 104.
As to the gift of an open account by the delivery of a book of accounts,
see Jones' Adm'r v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126 (1898) ; Ashby v. Carr,
40 Miss. 64 (1866); Cornwell v. Baldwin's Bank, 12 App. Div. 227, 43 N.
Y. Supp. 771 (4th Dep't 1896).
10- Wilson v. Featherston, supra note 98, at 751, 30 S. E. at 326.
102 Supra note 58.
Aos The fact that a pass-book is not a written obligation is illustrated
by Stark v. Long, 270 S. W. 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), where it was held,
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that the delivery of such a book cannot operate as a gift of the
deposit throw no discredit upon the doctrine of In re Huggn.s
Estate or any other of the cases holding that the delivery of an
instrument completely evidencing an obligation ,o may operate
as an irrevocable assignment of the chose.
In light of this discussion the following restatement is sug-
gested as representing the law of gifts of choses in action by
delivery:
The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous assign-
ment is revocable by the assignor's death, by a subsequent as-
signment by the assignor, or by notice from the assignor re-
ceived by the assignee or by the obligor unless: (a) . . .Y5 or
(b) the assignor delivers to the assignee an instrument in vrit-
ing which satisfies one or both of the following requirements:
(1) that it be an instrument which, by the terms of the as-
that a notation in a bank pass-book is not a contract in writing binding
the bank to pay the depositor the amount stated. See also, 1 MoasE, BANKS
AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 290.
In Talcott v. First Nat. Bank of Lamed, 53 Kan. 480, 36 Pac. 1066
(1894), it was held that an action on a deposit evidenced by a pass-book
is not an action within a statute providing: "An action upon any agree-
ment, contract or promise in writing" must be brought "within five years."
The case was distinguished from one where the action was brought on a
certificate of deposit which the court held to be an action upon a written
contract. The court in the Talcott case said that a certificate of deposit
contains a written promise to pay but a pass-book does not. This case
should be carefully distinguished from Schalucky v. Field, 124 Ill. 617,
16 N. E. 904 (1888), holding that an action on a pass-book is within a
statute providing, "Actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange,
written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in
writing shall be commenced within ten years .... " A pass-book is an evi-
dence of indebtedness, so the court said, but it is not a written obligation.
'o Cases relating to actions upon receipts are very instructive as to
what instruments constitute written obligations. As pointed out by the
Indiana court, a simple receipt merely acknowledging the payment of
money or the delivery of a thing is but prima; facie evidence of the fact
of payment or delivery and does not exclude parol testimony dealing with
the same fact. But if the receipt also contains a contract to do some-
thing in relation to the thing delivered, in so far as it is evidence of that
contract between the parties, it stands on the footing of all other con-
tracts in writing and cannot be contradicted or varied by parol. Dale v.
Evans, 14 Ind. 288 (1860). Thus an instrument reading, "Received of
Joseph S. Long sixteen hundred dollars, on deposit, in National currency.
Straus Bros." is a written contract for the payment of money within
the statute of frauds, for the words "on deposit' import a contract. Long
v. Straus, 107 Ind. 94, 6 N. E. 123 (1886). Similarly the phrase, "for
safe keeping" implies a promise. Tisloe v. Graeter, 1 Blackf. 353 (Ind.
1825). And the word "payable." First Nat. Bank of Farmcrsville v.
Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex. 40 (1892). An unsigned deposit slip binds
no one and hence does not constitute a written obligation. Van Vleet v.
McCarn, 18 N. Y. St. Rep. 73, 2 N. Y. Supp. 675 (Sup. Ct. 1888).




signed contract, is required to be presented or surrendered to
the obligor as a condition to the obligor's duty to perform; or
(2) that it be an instrument acknowledging and setting forth
the terms of the indebtedness or obligation on the part of the
obligor; or (c) ....
It is the purpose of clause (1) to state the rule of the savings
bank book cases which should be applicable to any instrument
required to be presented to the obligor. This suggested sub-
section involves no substantial change in Section 158 (1) clause
(b) as it now stands in the Restatement. The existing section
describes the instrument delivered as a "tangible token or writ-
ing, the surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract
for its enforcement." It is submitted that the suggested sub-
section is clearer in defining the instrument as one "which, by
the terms of the assigned contract, is required to be presented or
surrendered to the obligor as a condition to the obligor's duty
to perform." This statement leaves no doubt as to the way in
which the surrender of the instrument would be required for
the enforcement of the contract.
In clause (2) an attempt is made to set forth the principle of
the cases dealing with non-negotiable promissory notes, insur-
ance policies, receipts, written contracts, and similar instru-
ments not required to be presented to the obligor. The phrase
"acknowledging and setting forth the terms of the indebtedness
or obligation on the part of the obligor" implies that the instru-
ment shall contain the obligor's express or implied promise '0
to perform the assigned contract and implies further that the
instrument shall be signed by the obligor or his agent and shall
contain the essential provisions of the contract.
The rule that an irrevocable gift of a chose in action may be
made by the delivery of an instrument completely evidencing
it not only states the view of the authorities, but expresses a
sound policy. The chief value of the requirement of delivery is
the fact that the act of transferring the property is evidence
of the donor's intent and, perhaps what is more important,
serves to impress upon the donor the significance of his act.
These purposes are served by the delivery of a writing which
embodies the obligation assigned. Such an instrument repre-
sents the chose, at least to the layman if not to the lawyer, and
its delivery impresses upon the donor the significance of his
act and fairly indicates his intention to consummate the gift.
lo The obligor's promise may be implied from a construction of the terms
of the instrument. See supra note 104.
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